

## Leadership dimensions among developing nations in the United Nations

Stokman, Frans N.; Schuur, Wijbrandt H. van

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version  
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:  
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften

### Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Stokman, F. N., & Schuur, W. H. v. (1980). Leadership dimensions among developing nations in the United Nations. In J. M. Clubb, & E. K. Scheuch (Eds.), *Historical social research : the use of historical and process-produced data* (pp. 319-341). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-326382>

### Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

### Terms of use:

This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public. By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

## Leadership Dimensions Among Developing Nations in the United Nations

### 1. Object of the Study and Theoretical Framework<sup>1</sup>

This paper contains an analysis of historical trends in group cohesion and leadership among developing nations within the United Nations General Assembly over the 1950's and 1960's. This study has several theoretical aspects.

For the developing nations the 1950's and 1960's were the transitional period from the colonial to the neo-colonial era, in which they created their own group- and negotiation structures to cope with their new situation. Within the United Nations the Afro-Asian countries started consultations in 1949 on an ad hoc basis; regular caucus meetings of this group began in 1955 after the Bandung Conference. In the 1950's Afro-Asian group formation was primarily focussed on problems of political independence and political non-alignment. Because of their remote interest in these problems, Latin American countries did not participate in these groups. Instead, they continued to hold their own regular caucus meetings as they had from the beginning of the United Nations. However, faced with the basic problems of economic dependence and development the politically independent Afro-Asian and Latin American countries began to realize that they had in the early sixties a common interest in a new policy for international trade and development. This led to the formation in 1963 of the „Group of 77“, in which they would coordinate their policies in the Second (economic) Committee of the General Assembly and the UNCTAD conferences.

*The fifth session (1950)* was chosen as our first year of analysis, because one can hardly speak of an Afro-Asian group before that year (Tadic, 1969). This group is

<sup>1</sup> This paper is one of the publications of a research project on legislative behavior at the Institute for Political Science of the University of Amsterdam. A more extensive publication on Third World group formation in the United Nations is forthcoming (Stokman, Frans N., Roll Calls and Sponsorship. A methodological analysis of Third World group formation in the United Nations, Leyden 1977). Prof. Dr. P. R. Baehr and Prof. Dr. R. J. Mokken of the Institute for Political Science of the University of Amsterdam were involved in this project on Third World group formation from its very beginning. In all phases of the study they provided valuable advice.

the most important subgroup we analyzed within the whole group of developing nations. By the time of the Korean war the Afro-Asian states realized that a war between the great powers might well be waged in Asia. This strongly stimulated Afro-Asian group formation and the predominantly Afro-Asian non-alignment movement.

*The 23rd session (1968)* was the last session studied, because the General Assembly Official Records of later sessions were not yet available in the Netherlands at the time the material for this study was collected. Given our research aims, the 23rd session is sufficiently recent, because the first years of cooperation of the developing nations in the „Group of 77“ are thus incorporated in our period of analysis.

The research period is divided into four periods:

- 5th — 10th session (1950—55)
- 11th — 14th session (1956—59)
- 15th — 18th session (1960—63)
- 20th — 23rd session (1965—68)<sup>2</sup>

We chose this particular division for several reasons. Within the different periods membership of the United Nations was relatively stable, whereas the differences between the periods are maximized in this respect. Moreover, the division roughly corresponds to generally observed and reported developments in group formation among the developing nations — in particular among the Afro-Asian nations — both inside and outside the United Nations.

At the end of the 10th session a large number of new members were able to enter the United Nations as the result of a „package deal“ between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Security Council. For the developments in the Afro-Asian group a split between 1954 and 1955 might have been more preferable. In the spring of 1955 Afro-Asian group formation was strongly stimulated at the Bandung Conference. From that time on, the Afro-Asian delegations at the United Nations met in regular caucus, the so-called Asian-African caucusing group.

At the beginning of the 15th session a large number of newly independent African States entered the United Nations en bloc. This drastically changed the relative strength of this group of states within both the Afro-Asian group and the United Nations as a whole. The Asian-African caucusing group was renamed Afro-Asian group and developments in Africa came to the fore.

The main reason for the division between the third and fourth period is the formation of the „Group of 77“ at the 1963 session. Can we discover differences in leadership and group cohesion before and after the formation of this group and before and after the experiences at the first UNCTAD-conference at Geneva in 1964?

<sup>2</sup> In the 19th session no votes were taken in the General Assembly in order to prevent suspension of the voting rights of the Soviet Union and France, which had fallen in arrears in their payments because of their refusal to contribute to the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East. The session is therefore not included in our study.

A systematic analysis of leadership and group cohesion among the developing nations can be based on their behavior in the *UN General Assembly*, because the United Nations has always been an important instrument of their foreign policy. This has particularly been the case since 1960, when they achieved a majority position within the Assembly. This position has enabled them to transform their policy preferences into policy outputs of the United Nations, even when the great powers are opposed. This majority position had to be organized if it was to make effective use of the United Nations at all. Within this perspective, we can reformulate the main object of our study as a systematic study of the degree to which the developing nations acted as a group within the UN General Assembly; whether they did increasingly so over time and which delegations played an important role in this group process.

Such a systematic study of group processes within the UN General Assembly requires a *theoretical framework* in which the concepts of group, leadership and cohesion are related to the political process in the United Nations General Assembly. Only then are we able to determine the functions that the group must perform to realize its group goals.

In small group theories the concept *group* has a very broad meaning. Gibb, who reviewed research on leadership in small groups, defined a group on the basis of *interaction* of its members and *common purposes or goals*<sup>3</sup>. In conformity with this approach we shall speak of a *group of delegations*, if these delegations have *common purposes or goals and if they interact with each other to attain these goals*.

*Cohesiveness or cohesion of the group* refers to the degree to which the members of a group desire to remain in the group. It can be conceived as the resultant of all forces acting on members to remain in the group<sup>4</sup>. If we apply this definition to the United Nations, we can consider a group of delegations as cohesive to the extent that they agree on the group goals, the group is seen as a necessary instrument to reach the common goals and there is agreement with respect to the *group functions*, or activities that help the group achieve its group goals. *Leadership*, then, is viewed as the actual performance of these *group functions*.

Given the above definitions the first step is to identify the *group goals* of the developing nations at the time of our analysis. Socio-economic issues in the General Assembly can be considered as related to the group goals of the developing nations as a whole, because socio-economic problems have been the focus of the „Group of 77“ since its beginning. The important subgroup of Afro-Asian countries, however, has a broader value basis: colonial questions has been the other main issue area with which this group was concerned from the beginning. Our analysis has therefore been confined to the broad issue areas of *colonial and socio-economic problems*<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Gibb, Cecil A., Leadership, in: Lindzey, Gardner, and Aronson, Elliot (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. 4, 2nd ed., Reading/Mass. 1969, p. 207.

<sup>4</sup> Cartwright, Dorwin, and Zander, Alwin (eds.), *Group Dynamics Research and Theory*, 3rd ed., New York 1969, p. 91.

<sup>5</sup> Colonial and socio-economic questions were defined by enumeration of five subject cate-

Second, we must determine the *group functions* of the group of developing nations within the Assembly. The United Nations can be considered a political system, or more precisely, a political subsystem in the international political system, in which wants and demands are converted into authoritative allocations<sup>6</sup>. By group formation delegations are able to fix or change alternative allocations or to determine the outcomes of the allocation process within the system. In other words, the *primary function of group formation among developing nations is the exercise of political power and influence*. Political power refers to the capacity to fix or change (partly) a set of alternative allocations for the members of a political system or a part of it; political influence is the capacity to determine (partly) within a given set of alternative value allocations the outcomes of the allocation process<sup>7</sup>. However, political power and influence can be exercised in different phases of the political process<sup>8</sup>. Group formation, leadership and cohesion among developing nations can best be studied in that phase of the political process in which the developing nations try to exercise the most political power and influence. That is the decision-making phase. Thus, in their efforts to terminate colonial rule and to change their peripheral position in the international economic system, the developing nations have not been primarily oriented to prevention of decision-making in order to continue the status quo, but rather to a positive decision-making by the General Assembly. This has in particular been the case since 1960, because of their majority position within the Assembly. Since then they have had a very strong position in the decision-making phase of the political process in the General Assembly and as a consequence have directed their group efforts specifically to that phase and not to earlier phases.

Exercise of political power and influence in the decision-making phase implies that:

- 1) the developing nations should take *initiative* in the decision-making to formulate their policy aims and to bring them to the floor;

gories: (1) trust territories and the Trusteeship Council; (2) non-selfgoverning territories in Latin America (including the Caribbean), Asia, Africa and Oceania; (3) right of self determination; (4) problems between (ex-)colonial powers and former colonies; and (5) socio-economic problems (see Stokman, Roll calls).

<sup>6</sup> Politics and authoritative allocations are used here in a very broad sense. In this respect we follow De Vree, who adopted Easton's definition of politics (Easton, David, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York, 1965, p. 21) for use in the international setting (De Vree, J. D., *Political Integration: The Formation of Theory and Its Problems*, The Hague 1972, pp. 10 passim).

<sup>7</sup> Mokken, R. J., and Stokman, F. N., *Power and Influence as Political Phenomena*, in: Barr, Brian (ed.), *Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives*, New York 1976, p. 49; Helmers, H. M., et al., *Graven naar macht. Op zoek naar de kern van de Nederlandse economie* (Traces of Power, in Dutch), Amsterdam 1975, p. 65.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. particularly Bacharach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton S., *Power and Poverty. Theory and Practice*, New York 1970; Van der Eijk, C., and Kok, W. J. P., *Nondecisions Reconsidered*, in: *Acta Politica*, 10 (1975), pp. 277-301; Lukes, Steven, *Power. A Radical View*, London 1974.

2) the developing nations should maintain a sufficiently high level of *voting cohesion* to get their proposals adopted and to block undesired proposals.

*These two conditions can be considered the essential group functions of the developing nations and of important subgroups of developing nations within the General Assembly.* We can now ask whether the developing nations managed to satisfy these two conditions for the realization of their power position in the decision-making phase of the Assembly and which developing nations contributed most to this realization. In this paper we analyze only the performance of the first group function by the developing nations. For the analysis of the second group function and the relation between the two group functions the reader is referred to Stokman (1977 a).

*Leadership* will be indicated by *sponsorship* of resolutions, amendments and motions within the selected issue areas<sup>9</sup>. A group, if it is to change the status quo, must use resolutions to convert its policy preferences into United Nations decisions, particularly if that group occupies a majority position in the decision-making phase of the General Assembly. Discussing the various instruments of influence in the United Nations political system, Kay states that resolutions:

„... are viewed as the logical end toward which much of the activity of the Member States is directed. The activities of the permanent missions, the caucusing groups, and the various organs of the United Nations all bear the imprint of this ultimate ,parliamentary test‘ “<sup>10</sup>.

However, sponsorship of proposals by a delegation can be used for other purposes than goal achievement of the group(s) to which it belongs. Frequency of sponsorship may therefore not be used as an indicator of leadership in a group without further evidence that sponsorship has indeed been used for goal achievement of the group. We solved this problem in two different ways. First, initiative with respect to common group goals is indicated on the basis of the *network of co-sponsorship relations*, because *co-sponsorship* indicates at least compatible, but very often common policy preferences between the co-sponsoring delegations<sup>11</sup>. A central position of a delegation in this network of co-sponsorship relations between the developing nations or groups within that group indicates that such a delegation participated actively in the decision-making together with other group members. The number of proposals co-sponsored by a pair of delegations in that network indicates the extent to which these delegations jointly exercised leadership over the range of group-goal-

<sup>9</sup> One of the research aims of the larger study is a comparison of policy locations and leadership positions of delegations within the group. It required a research design in which selection of roll calls and proposals are closely related to each other. Therefore we selected roll calls concerning only those proposals that were sponsored by delegations and only those proposals that in whole or in part were subjected to a roll call vote. The sponsorship data were coded by Bronneman-Helmerts, H. M., at that time assistant at the Institute for Political Science, and Stokman.

<sup>10</sup> Kay, David A., *The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967*, New York 1970, p. 41.

<sup>11</sup> Mower, A. Glenn, *The Sponsorship of Proposals in the United Nations General Assembly*, in: *Western Political Quarterly*, 15 (1962), p. 662; Kay, Nations, p. 41.

related issues. For the detection of different leadership dimensions that number of co-sponsored proposals can therefore be used as a *measure of similarity* between pairs of delegations. This approach will be followed in the next section. Even if we would find a unidimensional solution, it does not necessarily guarantee the existence of one hierarchy of leadership. A one-dimensional solution might well be reached, because of the existence of different leadership clusters with large intercluster distances but small intracluster distances. If we find such an unidimensional solution, our second approach consists of a specification of a cumulative leadership model. We shall investigate whether there existed a *hierarchy of leadership* within a group. Such a hierarchy implies active participation of certain delegations regarding all group goals, i. e. general leadership. In the case of our sponsorship data we might speak of *one* hierarchy of leadership in a group, if sponsorship is cumulative: leaders in the group will sponsor a large number of proposals over the whole range of group-goal-related issues. „Followers“ in the group are more reluctant to sponsor proposals; they only become involved, if proposals are rather salient to the group goals. The more salient a proposal to the group goals, the more delegations will co-sponsor. If delegations lower in the hierarchy sponsor a proposal, the leaders of the group will also very likely be on the list of sponsors. This approach will be followed in section 3. It should be noted that the two approaches are related to one another. Delegations form a cumulative scale, a hierarchy of leadership, only if they have more co-sponsorship relations with one another in the network of co-sponsorship relations than expected in the case of random sponsorship. The scale analysis can therefore be seen as a special analysis on the network of co-sponsorship relations<sup>12</sup>.

*Group cohesion* among the developing nations is associated with both group functions. Here we only consider group cohesion with respect to the first group function. It is denoted *sponsorship cohesion*. It is reflected in the structure of the network of co-sponsorship relations among developing nations. If that co-sponsorship network contains different, mutually unconnected or loosely connected centers, it reflects a low degree of sponsorship cohesion. We then have different leadership dimensions among the developing nations. Another measure of sponsorship cohesion is contained in the results of cumulative scaling of sponsorship. If all delegations of a group form one cumulative scale, one hierarchy of leadership, it indicates a high degree of sponsorship cohesion; if the group is split over different negatively correlated scales, it indicates low sponsorship cohesion.

<sup>12</sup> Stokman, Roll call. See also Stokman, Frans N., Graph Theoretical Elaboration of Cumulative Scaling Techniques. This article is reproduced in this volume.

## 2. Co-Sponsorship Dimensions

For each period of analysis we can determine the different leadership dimensions among developing nations by a multidimensional analysis of the matrix of co-sponsorship relations among these nations. As we stated above, for each pair of developing nations these matrices contain the number of co-sponsorship relations over the selected proposals in a given period of analysis as a measure of similarity. For each of the periods the leadership dimensions could well be determined by a separate multidimensional analysis of the corresponding matrix. However, to interpret the recurrence of the same dimensions and their importance in the different periods as well as to circumvent interpretation problems in terms of rotation, reflection etc., we shall apply a method of multidimensional scaling, which gives directly comparable leadership dimensions over the different periods: INDSCAL (individual differences scaling).

The model assumes that different individuals perceive a set of  $n$  stimuli in terms of a common set of dimensions, but that these dimensions are differentially important or salient in the perception of different individuals<sup>13</sup>. In our case we assume a common set of leadership dimensions over the four periods of analysis, but these leadership dimensions are differentially important or salient in the different periods of analysis. In this application of the model the stimuli are developing nations and the individuals are periods of analysis. In the common or „group“ space the coordinates of the developing nations are given on the different leadership dimensions; for each of the periods these leadership dimensions are weighted according to saliency of the dimensions; these weighting factors are given in the „subject“ space of the model<sup>14</sup>.

A first impression of the main leadership dimensions among developing nations over the period 1950–68 can be obtained from the INDSCAL solution over all four

<sup>13</sup> Carroll, J. D., and Chang, J.-J., Analysis of Differences in Multidimensional Scaling Via an N-Way Generalization of „Eckart-Young“ Decomposition, in: *Psychometrica*, 35 (1970), pp. 283–319; Carroll, J. Douglas, Individual Differences and Multidimensional Scaling, in: Shepard, Roger N., et al. (eds.), *Multidimensional Scaling. Theory and Application in the Behavioral Sciences*, vol. 1, New York 1972, pp. 105–155.

<sup>14</sup> One may question whether frequency of co-sponsorship is a good measure of similarity that can be used for INDSCAL. Frequency of co-sponsorship between two delegations A and B is dependent of the marginals (the frequency of sponsorship of the two delegations): it can not exceed the frequency of sponsorship of the least active delegation. Some researchers advocate the use of a one-way measure of association (for example Yule's Q) as a measure of similarity to avoid this dependency upon the marginals (Weisberg, Herbert F., *Dimensional Analysis of Legislative Roll Calls*, Univ. Microfilms, Ann Arbor/Mich. 1968; MacRae jr., Duncan, *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting. Methods of Statistical Analysis*, New York 1970). However, if we had followed this approach, the similarity between two delegations would have been larger to the degree that their sponsorship is more cumulative. This has nothing to do with leadership: sponsorship between two delegations might well be perfectly cumulative, whereas they sponsor only



periods of analysis. Because the model requires the same set of stimuli (developing nations) over all individuals (periods of analysis), this INDSCAL solution is only based on those developing nations, which were a member state of the United Nations during the whole period 1950–68. This caused a drastic reduction of the Afro-Asian nations in this analysis: besides 20 Latin-American countries, only 15 Afro-Asian nations (of which only 3 African nations) could be considered in this analysis. In later analyses the new Afro-Asian member states will also be taken into consideration.

In Table 1 the twodimensional INDSCAL solution over the four periods of analysis is given. It accounts for 50 % of the variance in the data, which was not substantially less than for the three and four dimensional solutions (respectively 54 % and 57 %). On the basis of the weighting factors (Table 1 b) we see that the saliency of the first dimension steadily decreased from .58 to .11, whereas the saliency of the second dimension steadily increased from .22 to .74. On the first dimension of the „group“ space (Table 1 a) we see a number of clusters of developing nations. Most Latin-American delegations have positive coordinates, except for Guatemala, Mexico and Bolivia; most Afro-Asian delegations have strongly negative coordinates, but Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Liberia and Thailand have positive ones. This dimension is particularly salient in the first period of analysis (1950–55). In that period particularly Guatemala pursued an independent foreign policy until the American intervention in Guatemala in 1954, resulting in a coordinate on the first dimension close to those of the main Afro-Asian countries. The positive coordinates of Yugoslavia and the two more traditional African countries Ethiopia and Liberia in the period 1950–55 might be due to the fact that Afro-Asian group formations was not yet

a limited number of resolutions. In view of our theoretical objectives the best solution would probably have been the Jaccard index. If the cells in the two-by-two tabulation of sponsorship by two delegations are denoted:

	+	–
+	a	b
–	c	d

The Jaccard index is defined as follows:

$$\frac{b + c}{a + b + c}$$

Jaccard's index ignores the cell d. It assumes that that cell does not contain information: similarities of distances can only be based on the number of proposals, sponsored by at least one of the two delegations. If neither delegation sponsored a resolution, that resolution does not contain information about the similarity of distance between the two delegations.

Wolters introduced this measure for the analysis of roll calls in the Dutch parliament (Wolters, Menno, *The Unfolding of Roll-Calls and Thermometer Scores*, Paper presented for the IPSA-Congress at Edingburgh, 1976). In a later version of our paper we intend to perform the INDSCAL analyses on this Jaccard index.

very strong. Only the Arab countries already operated as a caususing group from the beginning of the period. Moreover, Afro-Asian group formation at the end of the period was primarily an Asian enterprise, at that time initiated by the main non-aligned countries Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia, which were the main con-

*Table 1: Two Dimensional INDSCAL Solution Over Four Periods of Analysis*

a. coordinates of developing nations in the „group“ space

	dim. 1	dim. 2
Argentina	.0444	.1295
Bolivia	-.0193	.1561
Brazil	.1028	.0850
Chile	.1066	.0672
Colombia	.1320	.1384
Costa Rica	.1352	.1574
Cuba	.0782	.0789
Dom. Rep.	.1159	.1755
Ecuador	.1450	.1296
El Salvador	.0198	.1999
Guatemala	-.1452	.1987
Haiti	.0060	.1448
Honduras	.1587	.1791
Mexico	-.0029	.1189
Nicaragua	.2095	.1545
Panama	.2630	.0869
Paraguay	.2251	.1431
Peru	.2546	.1377
Uruguay	.0382	.1503
Venezuela	.1391	.1086
Yugoslavia	.0828	-.2146
Ethiopia	.1916	-.3010
Liberia	.0716	-.2464
UAR	-.2286	-.2611
Afghanistan	-.2183	-.2227
Burma	-.2486	-.1431
India	-.2016	-.2623
Iran	-.1531	-.1217
Iraq	-.2323	-.2504
Lebanon	-.2469	-.1492
Pakistan	-.2158	-.1890
Philippines	-.2437	-.0488
Saudi Arabia	-.2474	-.1678
Thailand	.0836	.0025
Yemen	-.1998	-.1645

b. weighting factors of the periods of analysis (coordinates in the „subject“ space)

	dim. 1	dim. 2
1950–55	.58	.22
1956–59	.22	.51
1960–63	.17	.64
1965–68	.11	.74

venors of the Bandung Conference in 1955. Yugoslavia and the African countries became involved in Afro-Asian group formation at a later time. The second dimension of the „group“ space gives a perfect split between Latin America and Afro-Asia: all Latin American delegations have positive coordinates on this dimension; all Afro-Asian delegations (except Thailand) have negative coordinates. The coordinates on this second dimension are rather strongly correlated with those on the first dimension ( $r = .60$ ) because the main Latin American and Afro-Asian countries were already splitted on the first dimension. Nevertheless, the increasing importance of this dimension indicates, that over the 1950's and 1960's the split between Latin America and Afro-Asia became more important, whereas separate leadership clusters within the two groups disappeared over time.

The conclusion that different leadership dimensions within Latin America and Afro-Asia diminished in importance over the period 1950–68 was based on an analysis over developing nations which were member states of the United Nations over the whole period. In this analysis we could consider almost all Latin American countries, but only a small number of Afro-Asian delegations. This conclusion should therefore particularly be substantiated for the Afro-Asian group, because of the large number of new Afro-Asian member states, which entered the United Nations after 1950. We therefore performed a second INDSCAL analysis for 44 Afro-Asian delegations over the last two periods of analysis (1960–63 and 1965

*Table 2: Two Dimensional INDSCAL Solution Over the Periods 1960–63 and 1965–68 for 44 Afro-Asian Delegations*

a. coordinates of Afro-Asian nations in the „group“ space

	dim. 1	dim. 2
Cyprus	-.0381	.1114
Yugoslavia	.1280	.2154
Cameroun	.0213	-.2231
Central Afr. Rep.	-.0886	-.2859
Chad	-.0690	-.2252
Congo Brazz.	.0326	-.2650

Congo Dem.	.0778	-.0585
Dahomey	.0178	-.2732
Ethiopia	.0934	.1207
Gabon	-.2386	-.2486
Ghana	.1392	.0425
Guinea	.1555	.0264
Ivory Coast	.0127	-.2609
Liberia	.0860	.0642
Libya	.0939	.0544
Madagascar	-.0718	-.2380
Mali	.1496	.0276
Morocco	.0954	.0660
Niger	.0754	-.2064
Nigeria	.1282	-.0034
Senegal	.0472	-.1399
Somalia	.1092	-.0111
Sudan	.1430	.0448
Togo	.0932	-.1264
Tunesia	.1368	.0552
UAR	.1509	.0748
Upper Volta	.0607	-.1810
Afghanistan	.0585	.1075
Burma	-.2267	.1557
Cambodia	-.3863	.0865
Ceylon	.0091	.1156
India	.1269	.0810
Iran	-.0538	-.0118
Iraq	.1227	.1012
Jordan	-.0206	.1634
Laos	-.4876	.0412
Lebanon	-.0739	.2076
Malaysia	-.2428	.0618
Nepal	-.0080	.1457
Pakistan	.0704	.1005
Philippines	-.1757	-.0349
Saudi Arabia	.0413	.1584
Thailand	-.3305	.1649
Yemen	.0354	.1987

b. weighting factors of the periods of analysis (coordinates in the „subject“ space)

	dim. 1	dim. 2
<hr/>		
1960-63	.32	.61
1965-68	.67	.22
<hr/>		

—68). This analysis provides us the leadership dimensions within the Afro-Asian group after the entrance of a large number of formerly French African member states in 1960. In Table 2 we give the two dimensional INDSCAL solution over the periods 1960–63 and 1965–68. It accounts for 49 % of the variance in the data. On the basis of the weighting factors we see that the first dimension is particularly salient in the period 1965–68, whereas the second dimension is particularly salient in the period 1960–63 (see Table 2 b). The coordinates of the Afro-Asian delegations on the two dimensions in the „group“ space are almost completely uncorrelated ( $r = .01$ ). On the second leadership dimension most formerly French African nations have negative coordinates, particularly the African nations of the so-called *Brazzaville group*.

The Brazzaville group of African States got its name from the Brazzaville Conference in December 1960. This group consisted of twelve states, in essence French Community States<sup>15</sup>. Mauritania, Algeria, and Congo were the main topics on the series of conferences between these states. They favored Mauritanian membership in the United Nations; rejected demands for a referendum in Algeria, but urged France to enter negotiations with the F.L.N.; and supported a round-table conference of the various political factions in the Congo. In the United Nations they constituted an informal group from September 1960 until September 1961<sup>16</sup>. This second leadership dimension is only important in the period 1960–63, because African unity was reestablished in 1963 at the Conference of Addis Abeba, where the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded.

It is more difficult to interpret the first leadership dimension, without further analyses. On the basis of the analyses, reported in the next section, we can however, that this dimension is an *activity* dimension: the most actively sponsoring Afro-Asian delegations have high positive coordinates on this dimension, whereas the least active delegations have strongly negative coordinates; this dimension distinguishes the Afro-Asian leaders from the Afro-Asian followers (see particularly Table 6 in Section 3). The exclusive prominence of this dimension in the period 1965–68 indicates that Afro-Asian sponsorship is unidimensional in the period 1965–68. It substantiates our former conclusion that no distinct leadership clusters exist within the Afro-Asian group, even if we take into consideration the large number of new Afro-Asian countries. Leadership among developing nations is indeed increasingly organized along the Latin American/Afro-Asian leadership dimension, after a short period in which controversies among newly independent African nations played an important role. In the next section this will be corroborated by the analysis of cumulative sponsorship dimensions among the developing nations. Moreover, that method of analysis enables us to identify the leaders among the developing nations.

<sup>15</sup> The Brazzaville group consisted of Cameroon, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Chad, Central African Republic and Senegal. Mauritania was not a member state during the whole period 1960–63.

<sup>16</sup> Hovet, Thomas, *Africa and the UNO*, Evenston/Ill. 1963, p. 91.

### 3. Sponsorship Dimensions

A second possibility of detecting leadership dimensions among developing nations consists of specification of a cumulative leadership model. The cumulative leadership model is based on the notion of the existence of one hierarchy of leadership within a group. When do we speak of one leadership hierarchy within a group? We can not speak of one hierarchy if there is a division of labour in the group, in which one subgroup of delegations is active regarding a certain set of group goals, whereas other subgroups are concerned with other sets of group goals. In such a situation we shall probably discover several hierarchies of leadership, depending on the kind of group goals we consider. This can be denoted as issue specific leadership within the group. One hierarchy of leadership within a group implies active participation of certain delegations regarding all group goals, *i. e.* general leadership. Leaders in the group are then active over a broad field of group goal related activities, whereas the „followers“ in the group become only involved, if more central group goals are concerned. In case of our sponsorship data we might speak of one hierarchy of leadership in a group, if sponsorship is cumulative: leaders in the group will sponsor a large number of proposals over the whole range of group related issues. The more central a proposal is related to the group goals, the more delegations will co-sponsor. If delegations, lower in the hierarchy sponsor a proposal, the leaders of the group will also very likely be on the list of sponsors. This model of a hierarchy of leadership is equivalent to a stochastic cumulative response model (a stochastic version of the Guttman model), which was developed by Mokken<sup>17</sup>. The items in the model of Mokken are here delegations. The respondents or subjects in the model of Mokken are now proposals<sup>18</sup>. The trace line in the model of Mokken represents the probability of a positive response by a subject to an item, whereas in our application a trace line represents the probability of sponsorship by a delegation. For our analyses on hierarchies of leadership we can therefore apply the theory and procedures of scale analysis, as developed by Mokken.

We make only some remarks on these theory and procedures, referring the reader to Mokken<sup>19</sup> for more detailed information. For a hierarchy of delegations the fractions of the proposals, sponsored by a delegation, can be used for the ordering of the delegations in the leadership hierarchy: the higher the fraction of sponsored proposals, the higher the position in the hierarchy. This fraction is known as the

<sup>17</sup> Mokken, R. J., *A Theory and Procedure of Scale Analysis*. With applications in political research, The Hague 1970.

<sup>18</sup> In our leadership model we reversed the active and passive set of the scaling model: respondents are here proposals; items are now delegations. In this way we directly get cumulative scales of delegations (hierarchies of leadership). From another theoretical perspective the scaling model might be applied on this sponsorship data to get cumulative scales of proposals over sponsors. Delegations are then considered as respondents and proposals as items.

<sup>19</sup> Theory, in particular chapter 2, 4 and 5.

item difficulty. Here we see, that *frequency of sponsorship can be used to indicate leadership in a group, if the data fit the cumulative leadership model*. The proposals can be given a score equal to the number of sponsoring delegations. The order of this score gives an ordering of the proposals relative to centrality to group goals.

For a hierarchy of  $k$  delegations, it can be proved that for all delegations  $i, j$  ( $i, j = 1, 2, \dots k$ ) the *probability of co-sponsorship is higher than the probability expected on the basis of random sponsorship*: sponsorship of the different delegations in a hierarchy of leadership is positively correlated. This implication of a positive correlation was used by Mokken to define a criterion of scalability. Mokken used the coefficient  $\Phi/\Phi_{\max}$  as a measure of positive correlation between any pair of items (delegations). For a scale as a whole, Loewinger's coefficient of homogeneity,  $H$ , is used as a criterion of scalability in the sense of monotone homogeneity.  $H$  can be written as a weighted function of the  $\Phi/\Phi_{\max}$ , the  $H_{ij}$ 's, for all item pairs. Mokken also introduced an item coefficient  $H_i$ , in terms of which the scalability of each item (delegation) relative to the other items (delegations) can be evaluated.  $H_i$  can also be written as a weighted function of the  $H_{ij}$ -coefficients ( $\Phi/\Phi_{\max}$ ) of that item with all other items<sup>20</sup>. A scale, in our case a hierarchy of leadership, is then defined as follows: „a scale is a set of items which are all positively correlated and with the property that every item coefficient of scalability ( $H_i$ ) is larger than or equal to a given positive constant ( $c$ )“<sup>21</sup>. If all  $H_i \geq c$ . Mokken<sup>22</sup> suggested the following degrees of scalability

- a.  $.50 \leq H$ : a strong scale;
- b.  $.40 \leq H < .50$ : a medium scale;
- c.  $.30 \leq H < .40$ : a weak scale.

Thus, the coefficients  $H$  and  $H_i$  indicate the degree of hierarchization and the extent to which policy goals of the different nations overlap, whereas the frequency of sponsorship of a delegation indicates leadership in a group, if the data fit the cumulative leadership model.

On the basis of this theory of scale analysis Mokken proposed a class of scaling procedures<sup>23</sup>. One of these procedures consists of *multiple scaling*, the construction of a number of scales from a given pool of items. The multiple scaling procedure selects items (delegations) from a set of items (delegations) in such a way that the scale coefficient  $H$  is maximized. If no other items can be added to a scale on the basis of the chosen threshold level of the  $H$  and  $H_i$  coefficient, a second scale is constructed from the remaining items in the same way. This process is repeated until no other scales can be found which satisfy the threshold level<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> Op. cit., pp. 150 passim.

<sup>21</sup> Op. cit., p. 184.

<sup>22</sup> Op. cit., p. 185.

<sup>23</sup> Op. cit., pp. 187–199.

<sup>24</sup> For each period the analysis is performed over all states, which were member state of the United Nations during the whole period. However, delegations, which sponsored less than two proposals in a period of analysis, were eliminated for that period. Their correlation coefficients

Table 3: Cumulative Sponsorship Scales of Delegations; Period 1950-55

	fraction of sponsored proposals	$H_i$
<i>a. Afro-Asian scale</i>		
Iran	.04	.89
Yemen	.07	.79
Saudi Arabia	.10	.67
Burma	.11	.59
Pakistan	.12	.56
Indonesia	.15	.62
Syria	.16	.54
UAR	.17	.57
Iraq	.18	.54
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale $H = .61$		
<i>b. First Latin American scale</i>		
Nicaragua	.01	1.00
Paraguay	.02	.89
Panama	.02	.87
Honduras	.02	.66
Costa Rica	.04	.62
Peru	.05	.64
Ecuador	.09	.62
Brazil	.14	.65
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale $H = .70$		
<i>c. Second Latin American scale</i>		
Bolivia	.05	.57
Mexico	.07	.50
Guatemala	.10	.54
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale $H = .54$		

In Table 3 the leadership hierarchies are given for the *period 1950-55*. The three scales resulted from multiple scaling with a lowerbound of .50 for the item coefficients  $H_i$ . Therefore, the three scales in Table 3 are strong scales. The Arab delegations took an important position in the *Afro-Asian hierarchy* of 9 delegations ( $H = .61$ ). Iraq, the UAR and Syria were the three main leaders of the hierarchy,

$H_{ij}$  can only be negative or one. By consequence, they were quite often selected as one of the first items in the search procedure. This disturbed the results of the multiple scaling procedure. Only scales of developing nations are reported.



sponsoring respectively 18, 17 and 16 percent of all proposals. Burma and Indonesia violated the requirement of double monotony: their trace lines intersect those of the other delegations<sup>25</sup>. It confirms that the hierarchy is in essence an Arab leadership hierarchy instead of an Afro-Asian one. If delegations with item coefficients between .50 and .30 were allowed, the 9 item scale became a scale of 15 delegations ( $H = .51$ ). All 15 delegations were Afro-Asian delegations. The leader in this larger scale of 15 Afro-Asian delegations is now India, which sponsored 20 percent of all proposals. We reported the 9 item strong scale in Table 3 instead of the hierarchy of 15 delegations, because there were many disturbances of the double monotony in the larger scale. Only two Afro-Asian delegations were not contained in the larger scale: Ethiopia was eliminated because it sponsored only one proposal in this period; Yugoslavia did not scale with the other Afro-Asian delegations; Yugoslavia sponsored 9 percent of all proposals.

The results of the scale analysis confirms the low level of group formation among the Afro-Asian delegations, which we already noticed in the previous section. The Arab countries already operated as a permanent caucusing group from the beginning of the period. Only in the second half of the period India really managed to organize an Afro-Asian group within and outside the United Nations (Bandung Conference in 1955), of which it became one of the main leaders. Indeed, the hierarchization of the Arab group, but not of the overall Afro-Asian group, was strong enough to form a strong cumulative sponsorship scale. In terms of sponsorship India was the most active Afro-Asian delegation (it sponsored 20 percent of the proposals), but at least during the first years of the period 1950–55 it was an active Afro-Asian delegation without an effectively operating group of delegations around it.

In the period 1950–55 two *Latin American hierarchies* of leadership existed. The first, dominant Latin American hierarchy ( $H = .70$ ) consisted of 8 delegations. Brazil is the leader; it sponsored 14 percent of all selected proposals. The hierarchy can be extended to 11 delegations ( $H = .51$ ), if also delegations with item coefficients between .50 and .30 are allowed. Venezuela, Uruguay and Cuba are then added to the scale; they sponsored respectively 4, 6 and 11 percent of the proposals. They disturb the requirement of double monotony and are therefore not acceptable. The second Latin-American scale consisted of Bolivia, Mexico and Guatemala ( $H = .54$ ). At a lowerbound of .30 El Salvador and Yugoslavia were added. This resulted in a weak 5-item scale ( $H = .38$ ). Sponsorship of delegations in the dominant Latin American scale is completely independent of that in the Afro-Asian scale: the item

<sup>25</sup> The cumulative scaling model does not only require that the trace lines increase monotonely along the underlying continuum, but also that trace lines do not intersect, i. e. that the requirement of double monotony or holomorphism is fulfilled. It does not specify the function of the trace lines, however. If a set of items forms a scale following the criteria of scalability (a set of delegations forms an hierarchy of leadership following these criteria), it is still possible that the different trace lines intersect. This can be checked as described by Mokken (op. cit., pp. 180–182).

coefficients  $H_1$  of the delegations in the dominant Latin American scale with respect to the Afro-Asian scale range from  $-.09$  to  $.15$ . It clearly shows that the group goals of this dominant Latin-American group do not coincide with those of the Afro-Asian delegations. This is not the case for the second Latin American group. Sponsorship of these Latin American delegations is not quite independent of that of the Afro-Asian delegations: 6 delegations of the Afro-Asian scale have item coefficients of  $.30$  or higher with respect to this second Latin American hierarchy. This second Latin American hierarchy is closer related to the Afro-Asian scale than to the dominant Latin American scale: only one delegation of the dominant Latin American scale had an item coefficient of  $.30$  or higher with the second Latin American scale.

We conclude, that there existed three main leadership hierarchies among the developing nations in the period 1950–55: one predominantly Arab group and two Latin American groups. India was very active among the Afro-Asian delegations, but in the first years of the period it had not yet organized the Afro-Asian group effectively, Brazil and Ecuador were the leaders of the dominant Latin American group. Sponsorship of this group was completely independent of that of the Afro-Asian group. This group had therefore its own group goals, different from those of the Afro-Asian group. Guatemala and Mexico are the two main delegations in the second Latin American group. Until the American intervention in Guatemala in 1954, these two countries pursued an independent foreign policy. These results correspond remarkably well with the coordinates of the developing nations on the first leadership dimension in the two dimensional INDSCAL solution over the four periods of analysis (see Table 1). As we stated above, that dimension was particularly salient in the period 1950–55.

To limit the size of this paper we do not extensively report the cumulative scales of delegations in the *period 1956–59*, referring the reader to Stokman<sup>26</sup>. For a comparison with the INDSCAL analyses we rather prefer to report the cumulative scaling results of the periods 1960–63 and 1965–68, because of the Brazzaville cluster in the period 1960–63 and the prominence of the Latin American/Afro-Asian dimension in the period 1965–68. Multiple scaling of sponsorship in the period 1956–59 showed the existence of a real strong Afro-Asian group under the leadership of Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Burma, the main conveners of the Bandung Conference in 1955. The Western aligned Afro-Asian delegations however formed a separate group or did not belong to any of the Afro-Asian groups. It indicates that in this period problems of nonalignment versus alignment in Cold War had consequences for leadership positions and structures among developing nations with respect to colonial and socio-economic issues. Group formation of Latin American delegations was very weak with respect to these issues. As far as Latin American groups existed, they took more pro-western than Afro-Asian policy positions.

<sup>26</sup> Stokman, Roll Calls.

In the period 1960–63 two main leadership hierarchies were found: an Afro-Asian scale of 44 delegations ( $H = .64$ ) and a Latin American scale of 8 delegations ( $H = .60$ ). Both scales are given in Tabel 4. They resulted from multiple scaling with lowerbound level of  $H_i = .50$ . Only three Afro-Asian delegations did not belong to the Afro-Asian hierarchy: the Philippines, Thailand and Yugoslavia. The Philippines had an item coefficient  $H_{ij} = .497$  with respect to this scale; in fact, it can be considered as a member of the hierarchy; it sponsored 15 percent of the proposals. Thailand and Yugoslavia had negative correlations with some other Afro-Asian delegations. However, with the leaders of the Afro-Asian hierarchy both delegations had  $H_{ij}$  coefficients above .50. Yugoslavia and Thailand did not belong to the Afro-Asian hierarchy, because they constituted different wings in this period. This can be seen from the following multiple scaling results. Apart from the two hierarchies reported in tabel 4, multiple scaling resulted in two other hierarchies. The first one (with Thailand) consisted of Colombia, Chile, Thailand and the Philippines ( $H = .61$ ); the second one (with Yugoslavia) consisted of Czechoslovakia, Haiti, Cuba and Yugoslavia ( $H = .75$ ). We did not report these two scales as separate hierarchies in Tabel 4, because all leaders from Indonesia to Ghana (with only one exception) and some other delegations had item coefficients above .50 with respect to both scales. They can therefore not be considered as separate hierarchies. These results strongly indicate *general* leadership in the Afro-Asian group with different wings among the followers. The four most active delegations in the Afro-Asian hierarchy were four members of the *Casablanca group*. The Casablanca group of African states got its name from the Casablanca Conference, held in January 1961. These African states<sup>27</sup> held more radical views on African issues and nonalignment than the Brazzaville group. In the Congo crisis they all favored the Lumumba faction and demanded UN support for that faction. They declared their intention to withdraw their troops from the ONUC. With respect to Mauritania they supported the claim of Morocco, which considered Mauritania as a part of Great-Morocco. In the United Nations about twelve formal meetings of the group were held between January 1961 and November 1962<sup>28</sup>.

In the selection procedure the former French African colonies were added to the scale as the 31st to 43rd delegations in the scale. Only one other Afro-Asian delegation was added to the scale in a later step: Iran was added as the last delegation in the hierarchy. The item coefficient of Upper Volta, which was added as the 31st delegation, was .59 at the moment of selection, but increased to .65 after selection of Gabon as 43rd delegation. Also some other item coefficients of former French African colonies raised during the selection procedure. Most former French African colonies systematically violated the requirement of double monotony in the final hierarchy of 44 delegations. This is in particular the case for the delegations, which constituted the Brazzaville group. The increasing item coefficients and the disturbance

<sup>27</sup> Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Morocco and the UAR. Algeria was not a member state of the United Nations during the whole period 1960–63.

<sup>28</sup> Hovet, Africa, p. 98.

Table 4: Cumulative Sponsorship Scales of Delegations; Period 1960-63

	fraction of sponsored proposals	$H_i$		fraction of sponsored proposals	$H_i$
<i>a. Afro-Asian scale</i>					
Laos	.03	.79	Pakistan	.19	.55
Turkey	.03	.48	Niger	.19	.66
Japan	.03	.60	Togo	.21	.60
Cyprus	.08	.59	Somalia	.22	.69
Yemen	.12	.54	Nepal	.22	.57
Gabon	.12	.54	Ceylon	.24	.66
Central African Rep.	.12	.61	Burma	.24	.60
Madagascar	.12	.59	Senegal	.24	.65
Saudi Arabia	.13	.58	Ethiopia	.24	.62
Lebanon	.15	.55	Libya	.26	.69
Dahomey	.15	.60	Liberia	.26	.60
Congo-Brazzaville	.15	.62	Tunesia	.28	.59
Iran	.15	.52	Indonesia	.29	.69
Jordan	.16	.61	Sudan	.29	.66
Malaysia	.16	.64	Mali	.29	.73
Congo-Dem. Rep.	.16	.60	India	.31	.69
Ivory Coast	.16	.60	Iraq	.31	.69
Cameroon	.17	.60	Nigeria	.31	.72
Cambodia	.17	.63	Morocco	.32	.77
Chad	.17	.58	Guinea	.34	.76
Upper Volta	.18	.65	UAR	.35	.78
Afghanistan	.19	.58	Ghana	.38	.81
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale $H = .64$					
<i>b. Latin American scale</i>					
Costa Rica	.02	.60			
Ecuador	.02	.55			
Guatemala	.02	.70			
El Salvador	.03	.54			
Peru	.04	.52			
Uruguay	.04	.68			
Argentina	.07	.56			
Brazil	.07	.62			
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale $H = .60$ .					

Table 5: Cumulative Sponsorship Scales of Delegation; Period 1956-68

	fraction of sponsored proposals	$H_i$		fraction of sponsored proposals	$H_i$
<i>a. Afro-Asian scale</i>					
Laos	.03	.79	Liberia	.34	.52
Turkey	.05	.65	Niger	.34	.61
Singapore	.08	.59	Burundi	.35	.62
Gambia	.08	.68	Uganda	.35	.66
Burma	.09	.59	Ethiopia	.36	.65
Malaysia	.10	.65	Morocco	.36	.64
Thailand	.11	.54	Tunesia	.37	.65
Gabon	.12	.59	Somalia	.37	.60
Trinidad & Tobago	.14	.54	Libya	.37	.63
Mongolia	.16	.65	Congo-Dem. Rep.	.38	.65
Central African Rep.	.19	.69	Togo	.39	.63
Chad	.20	.67	Sierra Leone	.41	.65
Lebanon	.21	.58	Pakistan	.42	.62
Madagascar	.24	.59	Sudan	.42	.68
Iran	.24	.50	Kenya	.43	.73
Kuwait	.25	.54	Mali	.44	.67
Jordan	.25	.59	Zambia	.44	.66
Nepal	.25	.58	Mauritania	.44	.63
Cyprus	.28	.65	Iraq	.45	.63
Ivory Coast	.28	.59	Nigeria	.45	.74
Ceylon	.29	.51	Yugoslavia	.45	.60
Congo-Brazzaville	.31	.59	Ghana	.46	.71
Senegal	.31	.60	India	.47	.71
Dahomey	.31	.65	Algeria	.49	.74
Upper Volta	.31	.54	UAR	.50	.71
Rwanda	.32	.59	Syria	.51	.74
Cameroon	.32	.60	Tanzania	.52	.77
Afghanistan	.34	.58	Guinea	.53	.79
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale $H = .63$					
<i>b. Latin American scale</i>					
Paraguay	.04	.91	Peru	.08	.76
Brazil	.05	.61	Costa Rica	.09	.64
El Salvador	.05	.89	Panama	.09	.62
Honduras	.06	.87	Venezuela	.10	.72
Mexico	.06	.57	Uruguay	.10	.78
Bolivia	.08	.75	Argentina	.11	.74
Dominican Rep.	.08	.67	Chile	.11	.60
Guatemala	.08	.82	Colombia	.11	.78

Haiti	.08	.74	Ecuador	.12	.79
Nicaragua	.08	.79			

coefficient of scalability for the whole scale  $H = .74$

---

in the double monotony can be attributed to the extremely high scalability among the Brazzaville delegations: the 11 Brazzaville delegations constituted a very strong hierarchy with a coefficient of scalability  $H = .83$ . They constituted therefore a group within the larger Afro-Asian group.

The second hierarchy in Table 4 is a strong scale of 8 Latin American delegations ( $H = .60$ ). The two largest Latin American countries are the leaders of this scale: Brazil and Argentina. They were not very active, however: they sponsored only 7 percent of all proposals in this period, primarily regarding socio-economic issues. The neutralist policy of President Goulart of Brazil from 1961 to 1964 did therefore not result in a separate hierarchy of leadership, close to the Afro-Asian, as was the case with Guatemala in the period 1950–55; it only resulted in a leadership position of Brazil in the dominant Latin American group, which it lost again in the period 1965 to 1968, as we shall see. One may therefore question whether the foreign policy of President Goulart was so neutralist as it pretended to be. At the lowerbound level of .30 only one other Latin American delegation could be added to this Latin American scale, Haiti. None of the delegations in the Afro-Asian scale had an item coefficient above .26 with respect to this Latin American scale. Sponsorship of Latin American delegations is therefore not related to primarily Afro-Asian proposals in this period. It holds at most for Colombia, Chile, Haiti and Cuba, which were part of the third and fourth scales. The small number of proposals, which were sponsored by these delegations, ranging from 2 to 5 percent of all proposals, make these conclusions tentative, however.

We conclude, that in the period 1960–63 the Afro-Asian delegations formed one main hierarchy under the leadership of the Casablanca countries. Among the Afro-Asian followers we can nevertheless distinguish three different wings: one consisting of Thailand and the Philippines; one consisting of Yugoslavia, and one consisting of the Brazzaville group. Among the Latin American countries there existed one not very active hierarchy of 8 delegations under the leadership of Argentina and Brazil, which was mainly concerned with socio-economic issues. This Latin American group did not fit in the Afro-Asian hierarchy; it had its own group goals regarding colonial and socio-economics issues. This was not the case for four other Latin American countries: Colombia and Chile belonged to the Afro-Asian wing consisting of Thailand and the Philippines; Haiti and Cuba belonged to the Yugoslavia-wing in the Afro-Asian group.

The scale analysis in the *period 1965-68* also gave very remarkable results. The first hierarchy is an Afro-Asian scale, which consisted of 56 delegations. The second hierarchy is a Latin American scale of 19 delegations. Both hierarchies are strong scales (see Table 5). The Afro-Asian hierarchy encompassed 53 delegations of the

Afro-Asian caucusing group. The three other delegations are Turkey, Mongolia and Trinidad and Tobago. Only 6 of the 59 Afro-Asian delegations were not contained in this large Afro-Asian scale. Saudi Arabia ( $H = .49$ ) and the Philippines ( $H_1 = .40$ ) were excluded. The four other Afro-Asian delegations had negative correlations with some other Afro-Asian delegations in the scale. For this reason they were rejected. These four delegations were Cambodia, Malawi, Maldives Islands and Yemen.

One of the most remarkable differences with the preceding period is the scalability of Yugoslavia. For the first time Yugoslavia is contained in the Afro-Asian scale. It sponsored 45 percent of the proposals, which is considerably more than in the preceding periods. Another striking difference between the third and fourth period is the scalability of the Brazzaville group. In the period 1960--63 these delegations disturbed the double monotony because they formed a subgroup within the larger Afro-Asian hierarchy with a very high degree of hierarchization ( $H = .83$ ). In the period 1965--68 the coefficient of scalability of the Brazzaville group is not higher than that of the whole Afro-Asian scale, namely  $H = .65$ .

The delegations of the Casablanca group still belonged to the leaders of the Afro-Asian group, but the Afro-Asian center was extended with a number of other delegations, in particular Tanzania and Syria. For the first time we found one Latin American hierarchy, which encompassed nearly the whole Latin American group. Only three Latin American delegations were not contained in this scale: Cuba, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago could be added to the scale, if item coefficients between .50 and .30 were allowed. Mexico and to a lesser degree Chile systematically disturbed the double monotony in the Latin American scale. Sponsorship of Latin American delegations was quite independent of that of Afro-Asian delegations. In this period sponsorship of Latin America and Afro-Asia were even negatively correlated: most Afro-Asian leaders had strongly negative item coefficients with respect to the Latin American scale.

We conclude, that in the period 1965--68 two main leadership hierarchies encompassed nearly all developing nations: an Afro-Asian hierarchy encompassed almost all Afro-Asian delegations, a Latin American one almost all Latin American delegations. It was for the first time that the Latin American delegations operated as one group with respect to colonial and socio-economic issues. It was also for the first time, that sponsorship of Latin American delegations was negatively correlated with that of the Afro-Asian delegations. These developments might well be the result of the same developments in Latin America, which led to the „Group of 77“. The common economic problems of the Latin American countries in the 1960's reinforced a group process among the Latin American countries with respect to these socio-economic problems resulting in a more encompassing group and at the same time more clearly defined Latin American group goals. The similarity of the economic problems between Latin America and Afro-Asia in many respects led to the formation of the „Group of 77“ as a coalition of these two groups. This further stimulated group processes within Latin America in this field: only as a distinct, well organized subgroup could the Latin American countries be sure to get the necessary priorities for their own policy preferences within the „Group of 77“. The strongly

regional character of the „Group of 77“ also presumed a distinct Latin American group. The fact that the Latin American hierarchy was particularly active with respect to socio-economic issues can be seen as a further corroboration of this interpretation of Latin American group processes at that time. In each case the results of the scale analyses clearly demonstrate that *the „Group of 77“ must be seen as a coalition between two separate groups: the Latin American group and the Afro-Asian group.*

#### 4. Conclusions

We conclude, that over the 1950's and 1960's *co-sponsorship* among developing nations was structured along one underlying dimension. Over time this underlying dimension took on increasingly the character of a split between Latin American on the one hand and Afro-Asia on the other: different leadership clusters within these two important subgroups gradually disappeared. In Latin America this was the case with Guatemala and Mexico, which followed a policy close to that of the main Afro-Asian delegations in the period 1950–55; in Afro-Asia it holds in particular for Yugoslavia and the Brazzaville group, which no longer existed as separate Afro-Asian leadership clusters in the period 1965–68.

Analysis of *sponsorship* showed that in each period the underlying co-sponsorship dimension consisted of different leadership hierarchies. These leadership hierarchies coincided with the different clusters of delegations on the underlying co-sponsorship dimension. It enabled us to identify the leaders in the different leadership hierarchies and it substantiated our conclusion that leadership among developing nations was increasingly organized into two subgroups: Latin America and Afro-Asia.

The separate Afro-Asian and Latin American leadership hierarchies in the period 1965–68 reflect the importance of the regional groups in the decision-making in the „Group of 77“. Gosovic distinguished three regional groups: Latin America, Africa and Asia. In UNCTAD's main bodies (Conference and Board) even the smallest proposals were referred to these regional groups for clearance<sup>29</sup>. Our results suggest, however, that the relations between the Asian and the African regional groups were quite different from those between Latin America on the one hand and the African and Asian groups on the other hand. At least in the General Assembly, the African and the Asian groups operated as one group, whereas the Latin American delegations still behaved as a separate group within the „Group of 77“, as far as their behavior in sponsorship is concerned.

<sup>29</sup> Gosovic, Branislav, UNCTAD. Conflict and Compromise. The third world's quest for an equitable world economic order through the United Nations, Leyden 1972, p. 206–7.